Using a newly developed dataset this paper examines the cyclicality of private capital inflows to low-income developing countries (LIDCs). The empirical analysis shows that capital inflows to LIDCs are procyclical, yet considerably less procyclical than flows to more advanced economies. The analysis also suggests that flows to LIDCs are more persistent than flows to emerging markets (EMs). There is also evidence that changes in risk aversion are a significant correlate of private capital inflows with the expected sign, but LIDCs seem to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion than EMs. A host of robustness checks to alternative estimation methods and control variables confirm the baseline results. In terms of policy implications, these findings suggest that private capital inflows are likely to become more procyclical as LIDCs move along the development path, which could render the conduct of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies more challenging in these economies.
Introduction
Starting in the 1990s several low-income developing countries (LIDCs) have experienced a significant increase in private capital flows (i.e. capital flows excluding official development aid and loans). Initially, this increase was driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows but by the second half of the 2000s, several LIDCs were experiencing increased non-FDI private inflows (Araujo et al., 2015) . Moreover, inflows to a number of these economies started to exhibit similar patterns and characteristics to inflows to emerging markets (EMs). In particular, numerous LIDCs experienced surges in non-FDI inflows in the period 2004-2008, i.e. LIDCs were "catching the wave" of the general increase in flows to developing countries in that period.
While greater access to international capital markets provides significant benefits to LIDCs (for example through investment and diversification opportunities, as well as an avenue for consumption smoothing in face of adverse shocks), it also brings new challenges for financial and macroeconomic stability. In fact, the empirical literature covering EMs and advanced economies has documented that international capital flows tend to amplify business cycle fluctuations and might reinforce the adverse consequences of procyclical policies that still tend to characterize a significant number of developing economies (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2005; Frankel, Vegh, and Vulletin, 2013) . Procyclical flows also exacerbate the procyclicality of the domestic banking sector with important implications for financial stability.
1 Hence, an assessment of the cyclical behavior of private capital flows to LIDCs is of crucial policy relevance.
In this context, it is useful to distinguish conceptually between three different cycles: the domestic business cycle (a staple of macroeconomic analysis); the domestic financial cycle (as captured for example by movements in domestic credit volumes, asset prices, interest rates, etc.); and the global financial cycle (movements in global liquidity, global risk aversion, etc.).
The main focus of this paper is the association between capital inflows and the domestic business cycle, although we also discuss the role of global financial cycles. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that there are important linkages between these three cycles that have been explored in a burgeoning literature (Obstfeld, 2014; Lane and McQuade, 2014, among others) .
From the perspective of the capital receiving economy, if international capital inflows are countercyclical relative to the domestic business cycle, they could contribute to mitigate macroeconomic volatility and effectively provide insurance against adverse shocks.
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Nonetheless, if capital inflows are procyclical, they would exacerbate macroeconomic fluctuations as well as amplify the domestic financial cycle, potentially contributing to fuel asset price bubbles and unsustainable credit booms.
In this paper, we investigate whether private non-FDI capital flows amplify or dampen economic cycles in LIDCs and whether the cyclicality of capital flows to these countries differs from the behavior observed for flows to EMs. For these purposes, we explore a new dataset constructed by Araujo et al. (2015) that overcomes some of the data limitations that tend to characterize capital flows in LIDCs.
Our main finding is that while gross private capital inflows are procyclical in general, they are less so in LIDCs relative to EMs. This conclusion is robust to alternative estimation methods and control variables. To our knowledge this is the first study to focus on the cyclical properties of gross non-FDI private capital flows to low-income developing countries using a variety of panel data estimation techniques and control variables. Previous efforts in the literature have documented unconditional correlations between broader measures of net (rather than gross) flows and the cyclical component of GDP, focusing on a comparison between OECD economies and emerging markets (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2005) or have regressed a broad measure of gross capital flows, including FDI and international reserves, on real GDP growth as well as country dummies and a country specific trend, but do not include other control variables (Broner et al., 2013) . Another recent strand of the literature has focused on the cross-sectional dimension of the data (Lane, 2015) .
Moreover, our results suggest that flows to LIDCs are also more persistent than flows to EMs. Among the control variables, changes in risk aversion are a significant correlate of private capital flows in most specifications with the expected sign. In addition, the evidence also suggests that flows to LIDCs tend to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion compared to the full sample. Trade openness and changes in the terms of trade also present statistically significant coefficients for LIDCs.
The results of models using the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator including external instruments are consistent overall with the fixed-effects regressions. We also follow empirical strategies that attempt to take into account the consequences of "risk-on/risk-off regimes" driving international capital flows (Lane, 2015) and the results regarding the procyclicality of flows are similar to the ones obtained before.
The measurement of cyclical fluctuations in developing countries is challenging. To disentangle transitory fluctuations around a trend from shocks to trend growth, we also estimate regressions that include the growth of trend output on the right-hand-side in addition to a measure of the cyclical component of GDP. We continue to find a positive and significant association between capital inflows and the cyclical component of output. Furthermore, capital inflows are also positively associated with trend growth. But these associations are weaker for LIDCs relative to EMs.
Finally, we also explore whether the results still hold when alternative control and dependent variables are considered. Notably, the results are robust to alternative variables capturing the level of financial development; as well as to the inclusion of an index measuring financial reform. Nevertheless, when we consider net capital flows the results indicate that they are less related to the cycle than gross flows.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the cyclicality of capital flows. Section 3 presents the main features of the dataset constructed by Araujo et al. (2015) and some stylized facts regarding the unconditional (reduced form) correlation between private capital flows and the cyclical component of output. In Section 4, we discuss the estimation methodology and variables used in the empirical analysis and Section 5 presents baseline results. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy implications of the results.
Existing Literature
From a theoretical perspective, capital flows could be procyclical, counter-cyclical or even acyclical depending on the model. In traditional open-economy macro models for endowment economies, where frictionless access to international capital markets allows for consumption smoothing, net international capital flows should be counter-cyclical in response to supply shocks as agents smooth consumption i.e. countries would resort to additional international borrowing in face of negative shocks and would repay their debts during good times (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) . Nevertheless, Vegh (2013) shows that even in a traditional model, capital flows would be procyclical in response to demand shocks and/or if capital flows cause the domestic business cycle.
Moreover, Gopinath (2005) argues that in open-economy real business cycles models with capital accumulation, net capital flows, interpreted as the negative of the current account, could be procyclical or acyclical, depending on two counteracting effects. On the one hand, a transitory positive productivity shock would cause investment to increase, leading ceteris paribus to a worsening of the current account and consequently an increase in net capital flows (procyclical response). On the other hand, the shock would also lead to an increase in savings as agents smooth consumption, thus countering the investment effect and improving the current account (see Bakus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992 for a quantitative exploration with a focus on advanced economies).
Conventional models typically address only the behavior of net flows, but in a recent contribution, Van Wincoop and Tille (2010) construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with portfolio choice that permits the analysis of the behavior of gross capital flows at business cycle frequencies. The model consists of two countries ("Home"
and "Foreign"), two goods, and two assets (claims on "Home" and "Foreign" capital stocks, thus capturing equity-type capital flows). In this model, capital flows are driven by portfolio growth effects (which are related to increased savings), and portfolio reallocation effects (which are responses to changes in risk and the expected returns of investments).
Simulations suggest that positive productivity shocks to a country are linked to a reduction in capital inflows. While the "portfolio growth" effect leads to positive outflows and negative inflows as the productivity shock leads to a rise in "Home" savings and a decrease in Foreign savings; the "portfolio relocation effect" is the one that really dominates capital flow dynamics. At the time of shock, there is a retrenchment of capital flows as both Home Bianchi (2011) shows that in a DSGE model with financial frictions and a pecuniary externality, there can be overborrowing in foreign currency in good times, but also sharp adjustments in access to foreign lending in face of adverse shocks, triggering a Fisherian debt deflation mechanism of amplification of shocks. More specifically, the model features a credit constraint in which creditors restrict loans so that the amount of debt does not exceed a certain fraction of current tradable income and of current non-tradable income. Borrowing decisions by decentralized households affect the price of non-tradables and therefore the credit constraint. When the credit constraint is binding, a reduction in the relative price of non-traded goods (caused by a negative shock) leads to a large drop in the ability to borrow. Simulations of the model calibrated to Argentinean data confirm that in the decentralized equilibrium (where the externality is not addressed) net capital inflows are strongly procyclical.
Other approaches focusing on long-term movements of capital flows in extensions of the neoclassical growth model emphasize the importance of productivity differentials between the capital-receiving country and the global productivity frontier in driving capital inflows (Gourrinchas and Jeanne, 2013 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010) . In this context, only countries that are catching-up relative to the frontier should receive capital inflows and faster productivity catch-up should lead to more capital inflows. Nevertheless, the data does not seem to support this prediction. Even if at face value, this mechanism would suggest that capital flows are expected to be procyclical, the implications of these models for the correlation between the cyclical component of GDP and capital inflows at business cycle frequencies are not clear-cut.
The procyclicality of net capital flows to emerging markets is a well-documented stylized fact of the empirical literature. In a seminal paper, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005) show that the cyclical component of net capital flows to emerging markets and most OECD economies is positively correlated with the cyclical component of GDP. More recently, Broner et al. (2013) look at this issue for a broad sample of advanced economies and emerging markets. Rather than examining simple correlations, they regress a broad measure of gross capital flows, which includes FDI and international reserves, on real GDP growth, on country dummies and, on a country specific trend (country-trend dummies), but do not include other control variables. They conclude that gross capital inflows expand during good times, while they decline during recessions, thus confirming that gross flows are also procyclical.
Moreover, Puy (2013) using monthly EPFR data for a panel of countries and a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model that decomposes bond and equity flows into global, regional and country specific components finds that international portfolio investments are highly procyclical relative to global macroeconomic and financial conditions (measured by a variety of indicators), but his sample only includes a handful of LIDCs. His results suggest that portfolio flows by institutional investors act as shock amplifiers and that both equity and debt flows are procyclical relative to global financial conditions. In addition, this cyclical behavior is present both in advanced and emerging markets, even if procyclicality is stronger in EMs.
To our knowledge, there are no studies focusing on the cyclical properties of gross capital inflows to LIDCs. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005) 
Stylized Facts
Recently, there has been speculation accompanied with anecdotal evidence that non-FDI private inflows to LIDCs have started to pick up. Some clear events such as international sovereign bond issuance by a number of LIDCs have raised the question of the extent to which these countries are gaining, or in some cases regaining, market access. This would mark an additional development to the rise in private capital inflows driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s and 2000s (Dorsey et al., 2008) . Moreover, such events could signal that some LIDCs, the so-called frontier markets, would be starting to emulate the behavior of emerging market economies.
A New Database on Gross Capital Flows to LIDCs
In this sub-section we briefly present a newly developed database containing information on capital flows to LIDCs and emerging markets for the period 1990 to 2014 and discuss some stylized facts. Araujo et al. (2015) Adjustments might also take place to ensure consistency among the different macroeconomic sectors monitored by country desks.
In particular, WEO data is used to close gaps in the BOPS database whenever historical data from both sources were found to be consistent for a specific country. Consistency between WEO and BOPS data is also used to identify outliers. Whenever possible, auxiliary databases such as, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for international banking statistics, the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) Global database for equity and bond flows, and Dealogic for external bond issuance are used to judge the overall trend and presence of events. In the end of the process, the data is cross-checked in search for big outliers.
A special focus is devoted to non-FDI capital flows. This is related to the fact that a higher share of FDI in the total flows could be an indication that countries are riskier, less financially developed, and have weaker institutions (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2001 Dorsey et al., 2008 and Bluedorn et al., 2013) . Greater focus is given to gross flows, since shifts in those might create significant financial vulnerabilities and better capture changes in market access.
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Due to the fact that small and fragile economies usually follow specific dynamics, we also restrict our sample to non-fragile and non-small countries. 5 After excluding these economies, our dataset on gross non-FDI private capital inflows covers 66 emerging market countries and 31 LIDCs. Nevertheless, the number of countries included in the regressions in subsequent sections of the paper will be further restricted by data availability for the control variables. Araujo et al. (2015) show that the share of non-FDI private inflows to total flows is increasing in LIDCs and getting closer to figures observed in EMs. But, it is worth noting that non-FDI inflows to LIDCs are on average considerably lower than inflows to EMs.
However, as discussed in Araujo et al. (2015) , inflows to the top quartile LIDCs as a share of GDP are found to be comparable to the median inflows in EMs. Moreover, after the global financial crisis, inflows to the top quartile LIDCs converged to the top quartile EMs.
A First Look at the Cyclicality of Private Capital Inflows in LIDCs
This sub-section is a first pass at assessing the cyclicality of private capital flows in LIDCs by presenting reduced-form correlations between gross private capital inflows as a share of trend or "potential" GDP and the cyclical component of output. We use gross private capital inflows, excluding FDI as described above from the Araujo et al. (2015) database. Given the limited availability of consistent data on unemployment and capacity utilization measures for low-income developing countries, we opted to construct the cyclical component of GDP series using standard univariate filtering techniques. Thus, we applied the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the log of the GDP series at constant 2005 national prices from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table ( see Appendix A for a description of the data and sources) with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. Furthermore, we follow Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005) and compare capital inflows as a share of trend GDP in good and bad times, defined as periods when GDP growth is above or below the median, respectively. The difference between capital inflows in good and 6 Here we choose to focus on the relative magnitudes of inflows, by normalizing gross private capital inflows by trend GDP as in Broner et al. (2013) . Trend GDP is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a parameter of 6.25 to the series of nominal GDP in U.S. dollars. This approach tends to capture lower frequency movements of capital flows relative to the use of the cyclical component of capital flows, see Appendix E. bad times is denoted the "amplitude" of capital flows over the domestic business cycle. As 
Estimation
While the analysis of unconditional correlations allows us to gain some important insights regarding the cyclicality of capital flows to LIDCs, we believe that it is also crucial to control for certain correlates of capital flows and for time and country fixed-effects in order to isolate the importance of cyclical fluctuations and facilitate the comparison between EMs and LIDCs given several structural differences between these country groupings. Our empirical analysis draws on existing studies on the cyclicality of capital flows, but also borrows from the literature on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries (Frankel, Vegh and Vulletin, 2013; and Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008) .
Estimable Equation
In this context, we estimate several versions of the following equation:
where cf i,t is the private capital flows measure as a share of trend GDP in country i at year t;ȳ i,t is the cyclical component of GDP; X m,i,t denotes the control variable m (the 7 But it is important to note that these authors look at net flows rather than gross capital inflows.
set of controls are discussed further below); α i and λ t are country and time fixed-effects, respectively and i,t is the disturbance term.
In the baseline specifications, we use the cyclical component of GDP to assess cyclicality rather than real GDP growth, because we believe that this variable provides a more direct measure of cyclical movements. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that LIDCs and lower middleincome economies are likely to be undergoing important structural transformation during the period of analysis and in this context, the economic concept of "potential output" (as opposed to the statistical estimation of potential or trend output), is not clear-cut. In fact, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) document that in EMs, shocks to trend growth are the primary source of fluctuations rather than transitory fluctuations around a stable trend and it is possible that this finding also applies to LIDCs. We will attempt to disentangle some of these effects in the robustness section of the paper.
Firstly, we estimate the equation by using standard fixed-effects methods with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) corrected standard errors because of the possible presence of cross-sectional dependence.
8 Estimators conventionally used in panel data analysis require the assumption of cross-sectional independence across panel members. In the presence of cross-sectionally correlated error terms, these methods do not produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest and can lead to incorrect inference (Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata, 2011) .
Cross-sectional dependence is likely to arise because of spill-overs and/or spatial effects among countries or because of the presence of common (unobserved) factors. In fact, Puy (2013) documents the importance of common global and regional factors in driving bond and portfolio flows to developing countries.
Nevertheless, a significant problem with this framework is that the cyclical component of GDP is likely to be endogenous to capital flows. In addition, some of the other controls might be highly correlated with country fixed effects or could be themselves determined by capital flows. We will attempt to mitigate these issues by re-estimating the equation using GMM techniques, namely the system (Blundell-Bond) GMM estimator (see Roodman, 2009 for a discussion), which allow us to handle the potential endogeneity of some regressors by using lagged values of these variables as instruments. In addition, we will follow Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and use trade-partner growth as an external instrument for the cyclical component of GDP.
Control Variables
Based on the recent empirical literature on the determinants of capital flows (Broner et al., 2013; IMF, 2013a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Franken and van Wijnbergen, 2010; Faria et al., 2007 , Puy, 2013 , among others), we attempted to identify relevant control variables.
These could be roughly partitioned into global ("Push") and country specific ("Pull") factors,
as it is commonly discussed in the literature. Moreover, given our focus on the cyclicality of flows, it might also be useful to distinguish among different set of controls that account for global cycles (such as the VXO index and the terms of trade), domestic financial cycles (for example, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP), and other country characteristics (including openness and institutional quality). The list of possible control variables is long and ultimately, the inclusion of variables in the regressions was dictated by data availability for a large number of low-income developing countries.
Global Factors
Several papers use the VIX or VXO implied volatility index to capture the importance of overall global economic uncertainty, and/or investor risk appetite in driving capital flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012) . It is also common to include measures of global liquidity as control variables, such that more liquidity would be associated with increased capital flows in a standard "push" mechanism. Typical liquidity measures comprise interest rates in advanced economies and a measure of changes in the global money supply.
Moreover, changes in global commodity prices could also be included as a determinant of the profitability of investments in developing economies (IMF, 2013a) . Similarly, there might also be a rationale to consider changes in the terms of trade, which are likely to add a more country specific "flavor" relative to the aggregate commodity prices variable. For most LIDCs it might be reasonable to assume that terms of trade are mostly driven by exogenous (to the country) factors.
Pull Factors
The lagged dependent variable (past capital flows to a specific country) is included in regressions to capture herding effects and other departures from fully forward-looking/rational behavior by international investors (Franken and van Wijnbergen, 2010) . It is also a measure of persistence of flows and may pick up the effects of omitted control variables. In addition, a number of papers control for financial development/leverage using stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. The main rationale to include this variable is that countries with deeper financial systems would attract more capital flows because of the increased availability of instruments for investment. This indicator typically is not available for LIDCs, and we use credit to the private sector as a share of GDP as an alternative. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector are endogenous to international capital flows and therefore the inclusion of this variable could be problematic. In fact, Magud, Reinhart, and Vesperoni (2014) as well as Frost and van Tilburg (2014) have documented the links between capital inflows and domestic credit.
De jure measures of capital controls/financial account openness, such as the ones proposed by Chinn and Ito (2006) are also widely used, but these measures are also likely to be endogenous. Capital controls may affect capital flows in several ways. Controls on inflows constitute a transaction cost, sometimes prohibitive, that reduces the expected return from investment. Similarly, controls on outflows could be viewed as introducing a real options value (sunk cost) of investing in a country. Capital controls could also affect the risks of investing in a country. If for example, capital account restrictions are used to sustain an inconsistent policy mix they would be associated with increases in risk and in the likelihood of crises. On the other hand, if capital controls are effectively applied as macropruden-tial regulations (for example as "speed limits" on excessive foreign borrowing), they might contribute to reduce risks.
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Measures of institutional quality and/or country risk are also considered to be important, particularly because they are a crucial explanatory variable for total factor productivity and also more directly because they measure the risk of expropriation (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008 and Faria et al., 2007) . It is also common to include proxies for overall macroeconomic stability (such as the inflation rate), as increased stability is supposed to improve the attractiveness of a country to international capital inflows. Finally, papers in the literature also include measures of trade openness as a control variable. These are intended to capture demand for trade finance and other related financial services and/or sensitivity of a country to changes in global demand.
Baseline Results
In Table 1 we present fixed-effects regressions with standard errors corrected for crosssectional dependence for several specifications of Equation 1. We focus on the link between private capital flows (excluding FDI) as a share of trend GDP and the cyclical component of output controlling for a parsimonious set of variables that includes the lagged dependent variable; changes in the VXO index; de facto trade openness; leverage (private credit to GDP ratio); de jure international financial openness (Chinn-Ito index); changes in the terms of trade and a variable measuring country risk/institutional quality (the ICRG country risk rating with higher values indicating lower risk/better institutional quality). Appendix A contains a description of the construction of these variables and the relevant sources. We exclude small and fragile states from all specifications presented. We also exclude Ethiopia from the analysis due to significant weaknesses in national accounts statistics (IMF, 2014a).
The results for the first four specifications of Table 1 are in line with the ones obtained in the literature for broader measures of capital flows focusing on advanced economies and 9 There are several possible policy rationales for introducing capital controls as part of the toolkit for capital account management. A comprehensive exposition of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
emerging markets (Broner et al., 2013) might be a reflection of herding behavior by international investors, but could also be partly explained by omitted control variables. This result could also be seen as evidence of a lagged adjustment in capital flows to its determinants, such that the slower adjustment in LIDCs could be linked to higher transactions costs in these economies.
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Among the control variables, changes in risk aversion is a significant correlate of private capital flows in all specifications with the expected sign, but the association between the VXO variable and capital flows is weaker in LIDCs, as illustrated by the smaller magnitude 10 We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
of the coefficient for this variable in specification 6. This result suggests that flows to LIDCs are less sensitive to cycles in global risk aversion. Trade openness and changes in the terms of trade also present statistically significant coefficients in the LIDC sample (specification 6).
The terms of trade variable has a negative sign, which is in line with the results presented in Lane (2015) . This author argues that the negative association between changes in the terms of trade and capital inflows could be explained by a crowding out mechanism by which export revenues substitute for financial inflows. Finally, the coefficients for financial openness, leverage, and country risk are not statistically significant.
It is possible that the response of capital flows to the cycle might be linked to the size of the banking sector and to the level of leverage. Typically one would expect that in countries with a smaller banking sector and lower leverage, the amplification effects due to the financial accelerator would be less pronounced. Thus, it would be natural to observe that flows are less procyclical in LIDCs. Moreover, there might be "practical" reasons associated with the procyclicality of capital flows that might help to explain differences in the results obtained for LIDCs and EMs. For example, the types of financial instruments that are available to international investors could be a factor in explaining why flows are less procyclical in LIDCs.
LIDCs typically rely more on bank flows and trade finance, whereas in EMs cross-border flows take more the form of tradable securities that have asset prices Lane (2015) , which are themselves procyclical and thus might lead to rebalancing of portfolios over the cycle.
Overall, based on the results presented in this section, we can conclude that while private capital flows are procyclical, there is evidence that they are less so in LIDCs. Capital flows to LIDCs also seem to be more persistent. Furthermore, changes in global risk aversion are an important correlate of capital flows, but there is evidence that LIDCs are less sensitive to global risk aversion relative to the overall sample. Finally, it is possible that the differential response of capital flows to the cycle among different groups of countries might be linked to the size of the banking sector and to the level of leverage.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we present some of the extensive robustness exercises that were undertaken. In particular, we explore alternative estimation methods (system GMM regressions including external instruments); the presence of risk-on/risk-off regimes driving international capital flows (Lane, 2015) ; and we try to disentangle the differential effects of permanent and transitory shocks (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) . Furthermore, we also assess whether results change when using alternative control variables (in particular an index for financial development and an index of financial reform) and alternative measures of capital flows (for example by adding FDI flows to our measure of private flows and by estimating regressions with net rather than gross flows).
GMM Regressions
To mitigate possible endogeneity bias for some of our key variables, we re-estimate our models using the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. In addition to the usual inclusion of lagged variables as instruments (internal instruments), we follow Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and also include the comtemporaneous and lagged weighted GDP growth of each country's trading partners as external instruments.
11 We transform instruments using forward orthogonal deviations and present robust standard errors, which are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We deal with the bias introduced by high instrument count by collapsing instruments by variable and lag distance.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, contrary to the results previously presented for fixed-effect estimators, the standard errors obtained using this methodology are not corrected for cross-sectional dependency, which is only addressed here through the inclusion of time effects. In case time effects are not sufficient to remove cross-sectional dependence, it is possible that the coefficients obtained are inconsistent, thus the results should be interpreted with caution. The results are presented in Table 2 and overall are in line with the fixed-
11
The series for weighted trade-partner GDP for each country was obtained from the IMF WEO database.
effects regressions. Private capital flows are positively associated with the cyclical component of GDP in all specifications with statistically significant coefficients (albeit only at the 10 percent level in the specification that focuses on LIDCs and includes control variables). As before, the coefficient for the cyclical component of GDP is smaller for LIDCs, indicating that procyclclicality is weaker in these countries. In addition, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is higher for LIDCs, thus continuing to suggest greater persistence of flows to these economies or lagged adjustment of flows to determinants due to higher transaction costs. The VXO continues to be an important control for the full sample of countries and for EMs. In contrast to fixed-effects results, financial openness seems to matter for EMs, but not for LIDCs.
Diagnostic tests are mixed as far as the validity of instruments is concerned, the Hansen test suggests that overidentifying restrictions are valid for all specifications, but the Sargan test rejects the validity of these restrictions with the exception of specification 6, focusing on
LIDCs. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the Sargan test statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or serial correlation and, in this context, we believe that the Hansen test is more adequate.
Risk-on, Risk-off Regimes
Lane (2015) argues that the elasticity of capital flows with respect to country fundamentals varies with the prevailing conditions in international markets, because of the strong correlation between the scale of global capital flows and common risk factors. Hence, when analyzing capital flows to LIDCs, he advocates a strategy of estimating regressions over different cross-sections that would reflect these risk-on/risk-off regimes. We try to address this concern by modeling the "common risk factors" more explicitly.
The general empirical specification followed is summarized in the following equation:
where f t is a common factor that affects all countries and changes over time and is not directly observable. In the specification presented above, we only include one common factor for ease of exposition, but the specification can be extended to include additional common factors. The economic interpretation of the common factors is not straightforward, but in our application, it could be thought of a way to model the common risk factors referred to by Lane (2015) . The error term, i,t , is assumed to be white noise. The coefficients associated with the cyclical component of GDP and the control variables; as well as the parameter λ i (the factor loadings for the common dynamic factor) are allowed to differ across countries in this specification (note that we previously assumed that these coefficients were homogeneous across countries).
The estimation is carried-out using the common correlated effects mean-group (CCEMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) . This estimator uses cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables as proxies for unobserved common factors in the regressions. The estimator yields consistent and efficient estimates and its small sample properties do not seem to be affected by residual serial correlation of the error terms (Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata, 2011) . The CCEMG estimator also performs well when variables included in the model are non-stationary.
Nevertheless, the CCEMG approach does not cover the case where the panel includes the lagged dependent variable. In fact, as discussed in Chudik and Pesaran (2015) , the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable can lead to asymptotically biased CCEMG estimators if certain restrictions are not met. Therefore, we depart from the baseline specification and remove the lagged dependent variable from these regressions.
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Once again, we find that capital flows are procyclical in all specifications with β > 0 and statistically significant at conventional levels (Table 3) . But the magnitude of the coefficient 12 In the working paper version of this article, we reported CCEMG regressions including the lagged dependent variable. While results for the main variable of interest (the cyclical component of GDP) where in line with the results previously obtained, one of the referees pointed out that the fact that the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable switched signs across different specifications suggested some type of misspecification.
for specifications that focus on LIDCs (specifications 5 and 6) is substantially smaller at around 0.21 than the estimated coefficient for EMs, irrespective of whether control variables are included or not.
13 The common dynamic factor linked to capital flows is significant in all specifications and its coefficient is larger for EMs. To sum up, the finding that market-driven capital flows to LIDCs are less procyclical than private capital flows to emerging markets is robust to approaches taking into account risk-on/risk-off regimes driving capital flows.
6.3 Capital Inflows, Cyclical Fluctuations, and Trend Shocks Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) show that in EMs, fluctuations at business cycle frequencies are driven primarily by shocks to trend growth rather than transitory shocks around a stable trend, which characterize advanced economies i.e. for EMs "the cycle is the trend" in their words. In this sub-section, we try to disentangle the differential effects of permanent and transitory shocks by adding the growth in trend-GDP to the right-hand-side of our regressions. The results are presented in Table 4 . In all specifications the cyclical component of GDP continues to present positive and statistically significant coefficients, but the magnitude of this coefficient is smaller for the specification that considers LIDCs exclusively.
Gross private non-FDI capital inflows also present a positive and significant association with trend growth in the full sample and in the sample that considers EMs exclusively, suggesting that they are linked to permanent output shocks as well as temporary ones, but this association is not statistically significant in the specifications that consider only LIDCs (in fact trend growth presents a negative sign in these specifications). Finally, the results for the control variables are in line with those obtained in the baseline regressions. Overall, we continue to find a positive and significant association between capital inflows and the cyclical component of GDP when trend growth is included.
13 Estimation was carried out in Stata using the code described in Eberhard (2012).
Alternative Control Variables and Alternative Measures of Capital Flows
We have previously cited a number of studies that highlight a possible link between capital flows and domestic credit, which would imply the endogeneity of one of the control variables used in our specifications to capture the level of leverage or financial development, namely the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. To mitigate these endogeneity issues, we experiment with specifications that include an alternative broad-based financial development index proposed by Svirydzenka (2016) . The results for regressions including these indexes of financial development are presented in Table 5 . The aggregate financial development index is not statistically significant in any of the regressions for the different country groupings (specifications 1 to 3). Nevertheless, when we consider the sub-index capturing financial markets depth (size and liquidity of markets), the coefficients obtained are positive and significant at the five percent level for the full sample of countries and for the regression focusing on EMs. But the coefficient is not significant and is also close to zero in magnitude for the specification that focuses on LIDCs. These findings suggest that the size and liquidity of financial markets are particularly relevant for capital flows, but financial markets depth only seems to matter after a certain level of development has been reached (note that the average financial markets depth index is 0.25 for the EM country group and only 0.11 for the LIDC group). We also estimated regressions including the financial institutions development sub-index as a control variable, but this variable is not statistically significant and the results are very similar to the ones obtained for the regressions that include the aggregate financial development index. These results are not presented to save space, but are available from the authors upon request.
Crucially, the coefficients for the main variable of interest in this paper, the cyclical component of GDP, are very close in magnitude to the ones obtained in the baseline specification for the regressions that focus on LIDCs exclusively and somewhat larger than the baseline for the specifications that focus exclusively on EMs (the statistical significance levels are identical to the baseline regressions for both country groups). Therefore, the initial conclusions are reinforced by the use of these alternative control variables (aggregate financial development index and sub-indexes); capital flows to LIDCs are procyclical, but are considerably less so than flows to more advanced economies.
Moreover, to further explore the role of the financial sector, we include in our regressions the index of financial reforms constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) . Unfortunately, the limited data availability of this index reduces the LIDC sample to only 13 countries and, on the time dimension, the data on financial reforms only covers the years up to 2005.
Specifications 7 to 9 in Table 5 show the results obtained when we include the financial reform index in the baseline regressions. We exclude the financial openness variable because external financial openness is a component of the overall financial reform index. We also exclude the VXO from this specification because of the more limited time dimension, which impedes us to estimate the coefficient for this variable (that only presents time variation).
It is interesting to note that the coefficient for the financial reform index is significant and positive for the overall sample and for the sample that includes EMs exclusively, but not for the sample that focuses on LIDCs. The results previously reported regarding the cyclical component of GDP still hold, but the coefficient for the cyclical component of GDP in the specification that focuses on LIDCs exclusively is no longer statistically significant.
In addition, to further check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the baseline regressions using alternative measures of capital flows as the left-hand-side variable. The results are presented in Table 6 . We consider first specifications that include only gross FDI flows on the left-hand-side (specifications 1 and 2). These flows had been excluded from the original measure of private flows presented in previous sections. In this case, the coefficient for the cyclical component of GDP is not statistically significant both for the full sample and LIDC country group. The lagged dependent variable continues to be significant and positive in all specifications with large coefficients relative to the baseline. These results suggest that foreign direct investment is more persistent and less related to the cycle than private non-FDI flows. When we add FDI inflows to our measure of private capital flows (specifications 3 and 4), the coefficients for the cyclical component of GDP and for the lagged dependent variable present larger magnitudes in LIDCs relative to the baseline specification.
Moreover, we also estimated specifications with net capital flows (excluding FDI flows) as the dependent variable (specifications 5 and 6), adding portfolio assets and other investments assets to our measure of non-FDI private flows. The results suggest that net flows are less related to the cycle, as the coefficients obtained are positive, but not significant.
Conclusions
By the second half of the 2000s, several LIDCs were experiencing increased non-FDI private inflows. Moreover, inflows to a number of these economies started to exhibit similar patterns and characteristics to inflows to emerging markets. Indeed, a number of LIDCs experienced surges in non-FDI inflows in the period 2004-2008, evidence that LIDCs were "catching the wave" of the general increase in flows to developing countries in that period.
Motivated by these facts, we examined the cyclicality of private non-FDI capital inflows to low-income developing countries. We find that market-driven capital inflows to LIDCs are typically less procyclical and more persistent than capital inflows to emerging markets.
To our knowledge this is the first paper to quantify this differentiated response of capital flows to the cycle across groups of non-advanced economies. We also show that changes in risk aversion are a significant correlate of private capital inflows, but LIDCs seem to be less sensitive to changes in global risk aversion than EMs. These conclusions are robust to different estimation methods and control variables.
The findings indicate that private capital inflows are likely to become more procyclical as LIDCs develop, which could render the conduct of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies more difficult in these economies. For example, capital inflow reversals linked to domestic recessions could lead to pressures for currency depreciation and monetary policy tightening to defend the currency (to contain exchange rate pass-through or mitigate balance sheet effects), therefore exacerbating the economic downturn in the capital receiving economy (Vegh and Vuletin, 2012, discuss these mechanisms in the context of what they call "fear of free falling").
These interactions between procyclical capital flows and policies are particularly challenging for LIDCs, which are characterized by evolving policy frameworks where credibility is still being built slowly over time.
Consequently, policies to manage capital inflows and mitigate the destabilizing effects linked to procyclicality might become more relevant for these countries (see Ostry et al., 2012 for a discussion of the prudential toolkit to manage financial stability risks from capital flows).
Procyclical and volatile capital flows also pose challenges to traditional monetary policy frameworks in LIDCs that are typically based on targets for the growth rate of monetary aggregates. The instability and unpredictability of monetary aggregates reflect to a large extent high volatility of reserve money, which is linked to capital flows. This reinforces the need to accelerate the process of moving towards modern forward-looking policy frameworks in these countries (IMF, 2014b ).
An important avenue for future research would be to identify the precise mechanisms that are driving the results presented in this paper. We suggested that the response of capital flows to the cycle might be linked to the size of the banking sector and to the level of leverage in the economy. As LIDCs typically have smaller banking sector and lower leverage, the amplification effects due to the financial accelerator would be less pronounced. The types of financial instruments that are available to international investors could also be a factor in explaining why flows are less procyclical in LIDCs. 
